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FOREWORD
POLICING IMMIGRATION AFTER ARIZONA
JENNIFER M. CHACONt
T he Supreme Court's June 25, 2012, decision in the case 
of
Arizona v. United States' has already generated a wave of
scholarly commentary. The emerging consensus is that the ruling
was a significant victory for proponents of federal primacy in
immigration law. The Court rejected the voguish notion that states
have inherent authority to enforce immigration laws and laid to
rest the argument that states could enter the immigration
policymaking sphere by purporting to mirror federal immigration
law.' In striking down three of the four challenged provisions of
Arizona's controversial Senate Bill ("S.B.") 1070,4 the Supreme
t Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine, School of Law.J.D., Yale Law
School; A.B. Stanford University. Thanks to Dean Erwin Chenerinsky for his support for
my research and to my family for their love and understanding.
1. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
2. See, e.g.,Jennifer M. Chac6n, The Transformation ofImmigration Federalism, 21 WM.
& MARY Bi.L RTS. J. 577 (2012) [hereinafter Chac6n, Transformation of Immigration
Federalism]; Jennifer M. Chac6n, Arizona's S.B. 1070 in the U.S. Supreme Court: Who Won,
Why, and What Now?, 2012 EMERGING ISSUES 6515 (July 3, 2012) [hereinafter Chacon,
Arizona's S.B. 1070]; Lauren Gilbert, Patchwork Immigration Laws and Federal
Enforcement Priorities (June 26, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2093486; Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the
Limits of States Power: Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. &. C.L. I
(2013); Kevin R. Johnson, Online Symposium: The Debate Over Immigration Reform Is Not Over
Until Its Over, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2012, 8:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.coms/2012/
06/online-symposium-the-debate-over-immigration-reorm-is-not-over-until-its-<ver; David
Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41 (2012),
h ttp://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2012/07/I 5/reading
arizona.
3. See Chac6n, Arizona's S.B. 1070, supra note 2; Guttentag, supra note 2; Martin,
supra note 2.
4. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 25110; S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010), available at
http://wwiv.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/shl070s.pdf [hereinafter S.B. 1070].
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Court reaffirmed the federal government's "significant power to
regulate immigration."'
The ruling, however, does not signal an end to state-level
participation in immigration enforcement. State and local officials
will continue to cooperate in immigration enforcement-whether
by choice or compulsion-as a result of the federal government's
Secure Communities program, under which state and local arrest
data is automatically checked against a federal immigration
database.6 Moreover, because law enforcement arrests are an
important screening mechanism for determining who will be
targeted for immigration enforcement, state and local officials will
still have much of the "discretion that matters" when it comes to
shaping immigration enforcement.7 The Court's opinion in
Arizona did not fully acknowledge or account for the changing
nature of immigration enforcement. Consequently, the formal
reiteration of federal power will not necessarily ensure federal
primacy in all aspects of immigration enforcement.'
The articles in this symposium wrestle with these and other
themes that have emerged in the wake of the Arizona decision. All
four authors share the general view that the decision was a
significant reassertion of federal power in immigration policy. But
each author also offers some unique insights about the
significance of the decision. The four articles can be grouped into
two distinct subsets. Two of the articles focus on the effects of the
Arizona decision on immigration enforcement policies generally.'
The other two articles focus on a specific issue that the Court
deliberately declined to address in the Arizona decision: racial
5. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
6. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration (NYU Ctr. for Law,
Econ. and Org., Working laper No. 12-48, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm? abstract id=2109820 (discussing the roll-out of the Secure Communities
program).
7. Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement,
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REv. 1819 passim (2011).
8. See Chac6n, Transformation oflmmigration Federalism, supra note 2, at 58 1.
9. See Melissa Keaney & Alvaro Huerta, Restrictionist States Rebuked: How Arizona v.
United States Reins in States on Immigration, 3 WARE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 249 (2013);
Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement Under Arizona v. United
States, 3 WAKE FORESTJ.L. & POL'Y 281 (2013).
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profiling."o I have divided the discussion in this introduction
accordingly.
I. AFTER ARIZONA: UNDERSTANDING WHAT THE DECISION
MEANS FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
In their article Restrictionist States Rebuked, How Arizona v.
United States Reins in States on Immigration, attorneys Melissa
Keaney and Alvaro Huerta discuss the practical implications of the
Arizona decision. They use their article to explain that the way
forward for states wishing to enact state-level immigration
restrictions is extremely narrow after Arizona. They suggest that
states stay out of the business of restrictionist immigration policies
and focus on immigrant integration efforts.
Keaney and Huerta first describe S.B. 1070, the Arizona bill
that prompted the litigation, and Alabama's House Bill 56, a
copycat bill that went much further than the Arizona law in its
efforts to insert the state into the realm of immigration
enforcement." The authors explain that these bills were enacted
against the backdrop of Congressional inaction in reforming the
nation's admissions policies. They note that Congress has not
overhauled U.S. immigration laws since 1986, when it passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA").'" In the decades
since that time, the IRCA framework has not produced the
promised result of eliminating unauthorized migration through
more effective workplace enforcement. Instead, the unauthorized
population has grown to well over ten million people, prompting
states and localities to enact a wave of anti-immigrant legislation.
At the state level, the most notable early response was California's
Proposition 187.'" Although that law never went into effect,
Congress ultimately enacted comparable welfare limitations
through national legislation in the mid-1990s.14 The authors note
10. See Kristina M. Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial Profiling in Immigration
Enforcement After Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST j.L. & POL'Y 367 (2013); Karla
Mari McKanders, Federal Preemption and Immigrants' Rights, 3 WAKE FOREST j.L. & PoLY
333 (2013).
I1. Keaney & Huerta, supra note 9, at 249-50.
12. Id. at 252.
13. Id. at 251-52.
14. Id. at 254-55.
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that subsequent efforts to rationalize and reform immigration law
have failed to garner sufficient support in Congress.' 5
Although not mentioned by the authors, it is also
significant that Congress funded a massive increase in the
enforcement of existing immigration laws-both at the border
and in the interior-even as it failed to undertake any effort to
rationalize what is widely viewed as a flawed immigration system.
The "formidable machinery" of immigration enforcement
included the creation and staffing of what is now the largest law
enforcement agency in the country, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE"), as well as the nation's fastest-growing
segment of detention. 7 The ebbs and flows of unauthorized
migration have been largely unresponsive to these enforcement
efforts. Instead, migration flow appears to be most closely tied to
economic developments.' 8  But immigration policy makers
continue to emphasize border enforcement as the critical first step
toward comprehensive reform." Notwithstanding questions of
15. Id. at 254-55.
16. See, e.g., DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY (2013),
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/cnforcementpillars.pdf (describing the
tremendous expansion of immigration enforcement efforts in recent years); Jennifer M.
Chac6n, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010) (charting the massive growth in enforcement
spending over the past two decades) [hereinafter Chac6n, A Diversion ofAttention].
17. See generally Keaney & Huerta, supra note 9.
18. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON ESTIMATING COSTS OF
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT: A PATH TO BETTER PERFORMANCE (Steve Redburn et al. eds., 2011),
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record-id= 13271.
19. See, e.g., S. 744 at §§ 1101-1116 (leading off a massive comprehensive
immigration reform bill with a section on border security benchmarks and initiatives); see
also Press Release, Senator Schumer et al., Bipartisan Framework for Comprehensive
Immigration Reform (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.c-span.org/uploadedFiles/Content/
DocumenLs/Bipartisan-Framework-For-Immigration-Reform.pdf ("Creating a Path to
Citizenship for Unauthorized Immigrants Already Here That Is Contingent Upon
Securing the Border and Combating Visa Overstays"); Marc Caputo, Obama's Immigration
Reform Frays Nerves, But Shows Similarities With Marco Rubio's Plan, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 8,
2013, available at http://www.miamiheraId.com/2013/02/18/3241425/president-obamas-
immigration-reform.html#posting (describing Senator Marco Rubio's concerns about
what is missing from the Obama Administration's leaked immigration bill, including
"more border security" and "improved tracking of immigrants who overstay their visas").
For criticisms of this approach see, for example, GREG CHENN & SU KIM, AM.
IMMIGRATION LAWYERS AssoC., BORDER SECURITY: MOVING BEYOND PAST BENCHMARKS
(AIlA InfoNet Doc. No. 13013051, posted Jan. 30, 2013) (documenting that most of the
triggers that would have been included in previous comprehensive immigration reform
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efficacy, it is beyond dispute that federal immigration
enforcement efforts reached unprecedented levels during this
period, and this important fact sheds additional light on the
history that Keaney and Huerta provide.
In spite of the unprecedented federal enforcement
buildup of the past two decades, as Keaney and Huerta observe,
states have recently developed their own immigration control
legislation, justifying these efforts as necessary responses to
purported gaps in federal efforts.2 0 Notably, although lawmakers
introduced immigration enforcement measures in many sub-
federal jurisdictions, very few of these measures were actually
enacted into law.2 ' Two notable examples of legislation that did
pass are Arizona's S.B. 1070 and Alabama's House Bill ("H.B.")
56.
After providing background on these restrictive sub-federal
immigration regulations, Keaney and Huerta provide a detailed
discussion of the case law that governs the sub-federal regulation
of immigration." Earlier cases established that the federal
government has the exclusive power to determine immigration
policy" but also made clear that states can exercise their
traditional police powers in ways that may affect immigrant
residents.24 On the other hand, as Keaney and Huerta point out,
enforcement of immigration law is not an exercise of traditional
police power; it crosses the line into impermissible state
involvement in immigration policy. 25 Keaney and Huerta note that
guidance from the Department of Justice was quite clear on this
point until a 2002 memorandum issued by the Office of Legal
Counsel articulated a broader, and legally questionable,
understanding of state and local officials' power to enforce federal
immigration laws. Pushing the logic of this memo even further,
proposals have already been met and exceeded); Wayne A. Cornelius, Are Border
Enforcement Triggers Necessary?, CIR 2013 BLOc. (Mar. 8, 2013),
hitp://ccis.ucsd.edu/2013/03/are-border-enlorcement-trigger-necessary (questioning
the wisdom and elicacy of including such triggers in reform legislation).
20. Keaney & Huerta, supra note 9, at 255-56.
21. Id. at 256.
22. Id. at 259-69.
23. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941).
24. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
25. Keaney & Huerta, supra note 9, at 262-63.
26. Id. at 264-65.
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Arizona and other states attempted to insert themselves fully into
the immigration enforcement process. Keaney and Huerta
conclude that the Supreme Court largely shut these efforts down
in its Arizona decision.7 Their article describes the S.B. 1070
litigation and dissects the Court's decision in Arizona, emphasizing
the ways in which that decision narrowly circumscribes state
participation in immigration regulation and cooperative
enforcement.28
Keaney and Huerta conclude that, after Arizona, "as a
practical matter, state laws survive only where there is evidence
that Congress will tolerate the interference inherent in the state
activity, even if specific federal statutory authorization or approval
is not required."2 1 Thus, S.B. 1070's section 2(B) survived when
read very narrowly, but the Court is unlikely to uphold broader
efforts to criminalize migration or enforce immigration laws. In
light of this fact, Keaney and Huerta urge states to stay out of the
costly and fruitless business of enacting restrictive immigration
legislation." Instead, they recommend that states and localities
consider immigrant-friendly bills, such as California's TRUST
Act," which takes aim at what many state officials see as the
overbroad arrest reporting system created by the federal Secure
Communities program. They note that other integrative and
immigrant-friendly bills are possible to imagine, and that local
organizations can do more to promote them.
The question that the authors leave for the reader is: how
are we to square these immigrant-friendly bills with the strong
notions of federal preemption articulated in Arizona? After all, the
Obama Administration did not hesitate to file a brief in the matter
of Sergio Garcia, arguing that states like California could not
admit unauthorized immigrant residents to the bar of the state,
relying on the Arizona decision to make this argument." Like the
27. Id.at271.
28. Id. at 271-74; accord Guttentag, supra note 2, at 45; Lasch, supra note 9, at 320;
Martin, supra note 2, at 47.
29. Keaney & Huerta, supra note 9, at 275-76.
30. Id. at 276-77.
31. Id. at 278.
32. Id. at 278-79.
33. Brief for The United States of America as Amicus Curiae passim, In re Sergio C.
Garcia, No. S202512 (Cal. Aug. 3, 2012), 2012 WL 3822246 passim. Arguably, California's
decision to admit Sergio C. Garcia, an unauthorized immigrant, to the state bar is a
quintessentially integrative measure undertaken in the heart of state licensing authority.
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immigrants' rights organizations litigating the Arizona case, the
federal government relied on principles of preemption in its
amicus brief, but here, preemption was used to oppose a state's
integrationist effort. It is, I think, possible and indeed desirable to
articulate a substantive understanding of preemption that allows
for integrative laws, including those that would allow for Sergio
Garcia's admission to the California bar, while simultaneously
precluding state efforts to investigate and arrest noncitizens on the
basis of their immigration status. But it would be helpful for
advocates and scholars to fully articulate the framework for rights-
protective preemption. Keaney and Huerta are well-situated to
develop such a legal framework in both advocacy and scholarship,
and I hope that they will embrace the challenge.
Keaney and Huerta are focused on the big-picture lessons
that states and localities can glean from the Arizona decision, but
Christopher N. Lasch is focused on one specific enforcement
mechanism that is affected by the decision: immigration detainers.
With his article Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement Under
Arizona v. United States, Lasch once again makes an important
contribution to discussions over modes of intergovernmental
cooperation in immigration enforcement. While noting the
complexity of the matter, like Keaney and Huerta, Lasch generally
views the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States as a
decisive reassertion of federal primacy in the realm of immigration
enforcement.3 4 However, Lasch notes realistically that even after
the Arizona decision, sub-federal agencies continue to play a
significant role in immigration enforcement through compliance
with federal immigration detainers." Detainers are requests,
issued by the federal immigration enforcement agency to other
law enforcement agencies, asking that the agency detain the
noncitizen for a specified period so as to give immigration
enforcement agents more time to bring the individual into ICE
custody. Lasch argues that the Arizona case provides further
evidence that these detainers are constitutionally infirm.
This seems like the very type of measure that Keaney and Hucrta advocate for, and yet,
the Obama Administration is using the Arizona decision as a basis for invalidating the
decision. See id. at I1, 13 (relying on Arizona in arguments against the legality of Garcia's
bar admission).
34. Lasch, supra note 9, at 281.
35. Id. at 282.
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In an earlier article, Lasch argued that the reasoning of
Arizona required the conclusion that federal detainers exceeded
federal constitutional authority." In his article in this journal issue,
he reflects on the other side of the equation, using the reasoning
of the Arizona case to illustrate that voluntary compliance with
detainers by sub-federal agents also exceeds states' constitutional
authority. 7 Having previously concluded that federal detainers
exceed the scope of federal power, Lasch now argues that the only
possible legal justifications for compliance with such detainers
must come from state power to enforce immigration laws-power
that he argues clearly does not exist in the wake of Arizona.
Lasch begins his article by discussing the way in which
detainers operate and by explaining the rise of detainers as a
central feature of the nation's immigration enforcement efforts."
He notes that serious arguments have been made that challenge
the legal authority of the federal government to require sub-federal
entities to honor detainers, but here asks whether states that opt to
honor detainers in their discretion can legally do so." To answer
the question, he explores both states' civil immigration law
enforcement powers and criminal immigration law enforcement
powers,40 and concludes that neither set of powers justifies
detaining noncitizens solely on the basis of federally issued
immigration detainers.
The significance of the civil-criminal distinction in
immigration law is explained by both Keaney and Huerta,4 1 and by
Lasch. At least until 2002, the widely accepted wisdom was that
state officials lacked inherent authority to enforce immigration
laws and were not authorized to enforce civil immigration laws,
but that they could conduct arrests for violations of criminal
immigration provisions.4 2 Although proponents of S.B. 1070 took
a more expansive view of state enforcement authority, Lasch
36. Christopher N. Lasch, Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46
LOY. L.A. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2013).
37. Lasch, supra note 9, at 284.
38. Id. at 286-87.
39. Id. at 288.
40. Id. at 291.
41. Keaney & Huerta, supra note 9, at 264-65 (discussing the civil-criminal
distinctions made in the 1996 Offce of Legal Counsel memo).
42. Id. at 265.
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shares the view of other commentators43 that the Court's
reasoning in Arizona is inconsistent with theories espousing the
position that states have inherent authority to enforce
immigration laws independent of Congressional actions. 44 Out of
caution, he nevertheless starts his analysis with the more
conservative assumption that states have some inherent state
power. Even so, he concludes that states lack the power to
enforce federal immigration detainers.
With regard to civil immigration enforcement, Lasch
reminds the reader that "Arizona teaches that state officials may
not make arrests in circumstances where federal officials
themselves lack arrest authority."" Lasch notes that federal
detainer regulation purports to empower states to detain
noncitizens in a host of situations where the federal government
itself would lack the power to arrest-such as cases where there is
no probable cause to believe that an individual has violated civil
immigration law and where there is no likelihood of escape before
the issuance of a warrant.4 7 Since federal officials must adhere to
these arrest limits, the analysis the Arizona Court used in striking
down section 6 of S.B. 1070 suggests that state officials must do so
as well." Moreover, Lasch explains that detainer authority in some
cases exceeds the powers delegated to state officials by the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") section 28 7 (g), 49 and
that such authority cannot be justified as a form of "cooperation"
with federal officials engaged in enforcement, any more than the
arrest authority provided by section 6 of S.B. 1070 could be
sustained as a form of cooperative enforcement.o
Having established the fact that the enforcement of at least
some subset of federal detainers exceeds the state's constitutional
powers, Lasch considers whether selective enforcement of
43. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 2, at 41 (concluding that Arizona foreclosed the
notion that states had inherent authority to enforce immigration law); Guttentag, supra
note 2, at 35-42; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State
Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251 (2011) (providing a pre-
Arizona exposition of the legal fallacies of the mirror irnage theory).
44. Lasch, supra note 9, at 284-85 n.18.
45. Id. at 284, 293.
46. Id. at 295.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2006).
50. Lasch, supra note 9, at 299-301.
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detainers (for example, enforcement of only those detainers that
can be justified as constitutional after Arizona) could be
constitutional. However, he concludes that the discretionary,
selective enforcement of detainers runs afoul of the Supreme
Court's decision in Arizona precisely because it is discretionary and
selective, and therefore inconsistent with the development of
uniform national immigration enforcement policies."
Once he concludes that states cannot constitutionally
comply with detainers in the enforcement of civil immigration
laws, he considers whether the situation might be different where
criminal law is concerned." Here, again, he finds authority
lacking. Because presence without authorization is not itself a
crime, civil immigration detainers "are not likely to contain
sufficient information to justify prolonged detention for criminal
enforcement."5 3 As Lasch illustrates in detail, the detainer
regulation does not require evidence or even suspicion of criminal
activity,54 and in many cases, there simply will not be any evidence
of criminal violations." He demonstrates that the Arizona Court's
conclusion that federal law imposes clear limits on civil arrest
authority applies with equal force to criminal arrest authority.56 He
also notes that there are two existing legal frameworks that
establish the means by which federal officials can obtain prisoners
in state and local custody for the purposes of criminal
prosecution-the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers-and that the use of
immigration detainers falls outside of those frameworks and
therefore appears to be an extralegal means of achieving criminal
law enforcement.
Indeed, Lasch argues that the use of the civil detainer
should be read as a signal that the U.S. is not pursuing a criminal
prosecution and is instead pursuing the path of civil removal.
Lasch notes that in striking down section 5(C) of S.B. 1070,
Arizona made it plain that states cannot use criminal law means to
51. Id. at 301-311.
52. Id. at 313.
53. Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 316.
55. Id. at 316-17.
56. Id. at 318-20.
57. Id. at 322-25.
58. Id. at 325-27.
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attain the ends of civil immigration enforcement.59 Finally, Lasch
notes that because the civil-criminal line in immigration is so
difficult to determine, asking state and local officials to decide
when it is appropriate to honor a detainer as a lawful exercise of
criminal arrest authority as opposed to an unauthorized exercise
of civil arrest authority would simply be unworkable."' Ultimately,
Lasch concludes that the reliance of state and local officials on
civil immigration detainers cannot be justified in the service of
enforcing either civil or criminal immigration law.
Lasch has performed an important service in scrutinizing
immigration detainers. They are a common and pervasive feature
of the immigration enforcement landscape. But his trenchant
analysis, both here and elsewhere, exposes the troubling truth
that, not only are detainers not a natural and unquestionable
feature of this landscape, but they are unlawful as currently
structured. The federal government exceeds its power when it
requires states to comply with detainer requests. And states and
localities also exceed their own power when they comply-or
comply selectively-with such requests.
II. BEYOND ARIZONA: WHAT TO Do ABOUT RACIAL PROFILING
Keaney, Huerta, and Lasch offer important insights on the
legal and policy implications of Arizona. The remaining two
articles in the symposium shift the focus away from the
implications of Arizona and turn toward the great elephant in the
room in the Arizona discussion: racial profiling.6'
Karla Mari McKanders widens the inquiry around
immigration enforcement so that it focuses not just upon the
preemption analysis that drove the Arizona decision but also
includes equal protection questions that the Court has largely
ignored in resolving immigration enforcement questions. In her
article Federal Preemption and Immigrants' Rights, McKanders
explores the preemption analysis used by the Court in Arizona but
59. Id. at 326.
60. Id. at 327.
61. For a discussion of the Court's refusal to address issues of racial profiling, see, for
example, Chac6n, Transformation of Immigration Federalism, supra note 2, at 577-82; Licas
Guttentag, Online Symposium: Strong On Theory While Profiling Ignored, SCOTUSBLOG (June
25, 2012, 7:03 PM), http://wWw.scotusblog.com/2012/06/online-symposium-strong-on-
theory-while-profiling-ignored;johnoson, supra note 2.
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also highlights the limits of preemption in addressing some of the
second-wave litigation in the post-Arizona era. Like Keaney and
Huerta, McKanders sketches out the state laws that gave rise to the
recent bout of litigation, with particular attention to Arizona's S.B.
1070 and Alabama's H.B. 56, noting that S.B. 1070 was struck
down on preemption grounds.63 Preemption is the typical route by
which courts have invalidated state regulation of immigration. As
McKanders notes, in the sphere of federal immigration regulation,
discrimination claims have been largely unavailing," and some
would claim comparable discriminatory powers for the states as
well.65
McKanders then evaluates the role of equal protection
analysis in evaluating the legitimacy of immigration regulation.
Despite the fact that these immigration laws have clear civil rights
implications, she notes the reluctance of scholars to center equal
protection analysis in their challenges to these statutes. Because
the concerns that often drive the litigation against restrictionist
measures such as S.B. 1070 are actually concerns about
discrimination, McKanders suggests that it is time to reconsider
the possible utility of equal protection analysis in the wake of
Arizona.
Unfortunately, McKanders finds that the equal protection
doctrine has evolved in ways that have made it incredibly difficult
for litigants to successfully advance equal protection claims against
anti-immigrant measures." Although there is evidence of
discriminatory intent in the framing and passage of at least some
of these laws, and a lack of evidence supporting the purported
public safety and economic objectives that are used to justify the
laws, courts often have found comparable evidence insufficient to
establish the discriminatory intent needed to establish a successful
equal protection claim." Litigants have continued to press such
62. McKanders, supra note 10, at 336-38.
63. Id. at 339.
64. Id. at 340-42.
65. Id. at 342.
66. Id. at 344-48.
67. Id. at 348.
68. Id. at 350 ("Today, with state anti-immigrant statutes, courts are not likely to find
an equal protection violation.").
69. Id. at 353 (discussing the court's refusal to find an equal protection violation in a
challenge to a restnctionist ordinance enacted in the town of Hazelton, Pennsylvania).
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claims, most recently and (thus far) successfully in the case of Valle
del Sol v. Whiting, in which plaintiffs alleged that unlawful
discrimination against Latinos was a "motivating" factor behind
S.B. 1070.70 But the high standard of discriminatory intent
typically has proven difficult to meet in cases that involve laws that
populations targeted on the basis of immigration status rather
than race, no matter how tightly the two categories might
correlate.
McKanders notes that restrictionist laws such as S.B. 1070
have also generated equal protection claims based on the racial
profiling engendered by the laws." She notes, once again, that the
legal bar for establishing racial discrimination in these contexts is
almost insurmountably high, pointing to the Court's decision in
McCleskey v. Kemp 2 as emblematic of the Court's refusal to
acknowledge clear evidence of disparate impact as sufficient to
establish the discriminatory intent needed to sustain an equal
protection claim.7 1 McKanders also notes that the problem is
compounded by the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
which has sanctioned the use of race in immigration policing in
cases like United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte.7 ' By making clear the fact that the use of race in
immigration policing is appropriate, these cases further diminish
the possibility of successful equal protection claims based on racial
profiling in immigration enforcement.
Indeed, although McKanders does not expressly address
this fact, one thing that is striking about the Court's decision in
Arizona is the degree to which the Court blurred the line between
federal immigration enforcement officers, and state and local law
enforcement when discussing the power of the latter group of
officers to conduct immigration-related stops.7 ' Given the
permissiveness with which the Court has treated the use of race in
immigration policing, the Court's disregard of the distinction
suggests that the same loose standards for the use of race in
policing could arguably apply to state officials' determinations of
70. Id. at 352.
71. Id. at 353-54.
72. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
73. McKanders, supra note 10, at 354.
74. Id. at 359-60; United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
75. Chac6n, Transformation of Immigration, supra note 2, at 611-14 (2012).
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"reasonable suspicion" of unauthorized immigration status when
those officials are implementing S.B. 1070's section 2(B). Unless
the Court wishes to sanction the widespread expansion of racial
profiling, in upcoming cases it will need to clarify that the
standards that the Court has articulated with regard to the use of
race by federal immigration officers do not apply to state officials.
The existing profiling case law assumes a degree of immigration
training that state and local officials simply do not have.
McKanders notes that, at this point, there are lawsuits in a
number of jurisdictions raising equal protection claims against
immigration laws that allow immigration status determinations to
be made by state and local officers.78 As McKanders suggests, a
great deal of investigative discretion actually goes into the process
of making stops on the basis of immigration status. Meanwhile,
sub-federal immigration legislation does not provide meaningful
guidelines for the new policing tasks that officials are asked to
assume, and the training materials that govern implementation
suggest that the laws will be implemented with "'great reliance on
implicit attitudes and stereotypes.'" 7  This is disheartening, but
even more troubling is the absence of legal remedy when the
policing strategies give rise to profiling. Given the state of the law,
McKanders thinks that reliance on stereotypes in formulating
"reasonable suspicion" of unlawful immigration status is not likely
to rise to the level of an equal protection violation, despite the
inevitable racial profiling that will occur."' Ultimately, McKanders
is pessimistic about the ability of contemporary equal protection
jurisprudence to offer protection for individuals who raise
genuine claims of discrimination arising out of restrictionist
immigration legislation. She suggests that courts ought to take a
different approach to these kinds of claims. Given her trenchant
diagnosis of the problem, her readers would also benefit from
concrete suggestions about how the court might develop a more
useful framework for evaluating the genuine discriminatory harms
of these kinds of laws.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. McKanders, supra note 10, at 361-63.
79. Id. at 364 (quotingjason A. Nier ct al., Can Racial Profiling Be Avoided Under
Arizona Immigration Law? Lessons Learned from Subtle Bias Research and Anti-Discrimination
Law, 12 ANALYSES Soc. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 5, 11 (2012)).
80. Id.
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Kristina M. Campbell's (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial
Profiling in Immigration Enforcement After Arizona v. United States
also tackles the profiling problem, and she is perhaps a bit more
sanguine than McKanders about the ability of current equal
protection doctrine to provide redress in at least some cases of
discriminatory policing. In the article, she explains why the
"'reasonable suspicion' requirement of S.B. 107 0's section 2(B)
... will give rise to stops, detentions, and arrests based on
constitutionally impermissible factors such as race, color, and
ethnicity" and will "ultimately stymie the efforts of Arizona and
other jurisdictions to enact state-level immigration enforcement
laws.""' Campbell first describes the S.B. 1070 litigation, including
the decisions of the Federal District Court of Arizona, the Ninth
Circuit, and ultimately, the Supreme Court." After describing the
Supreme Court's reasoning in striking down three of the four
challenged provisions of S.B. 1070, Campbell then focuses her
attention on the provision that the Court upheld, section 2(B)."
Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 actually has two distinct parts.
First, it requires officers, when practicable, to request proof of
status during otherwise lawful seizures upon "reasonable
suspicion" that a person was unlawfully present. Second, it
requires the determination of an individual's immigration status
before the person is released after a lawful arrest. Campbell's
analysis focuses on the first provision, under which agents should
contact federal officials during an otherwise lawful stop if they
develop reasonable suspicion that the person they have detained
lacks legal immigration status. As McKanders notes,
notwithstanding the Court's unwillingness to address the matter
anticipatorily, the invitation to agents to police in this way will
inevitably lead to the exercise ofjudgment in ways that are tainted
by racial stereotypes.84 Campbell focuses on the fact that even
where plausible allegations of discrimination are made, it is not
clear what kind of remedies will exist for noncitizens whose rights
are violated. After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, immigration judges need
81. Campbell, supra note 10, at 367-68.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 384.
84. McKanders, supra note 10, at 360-61.
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not suppress evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment unless the violation was "egregious.""
Although the linkage between Lopez-Mendoza's
egregiousness standard and state-level immigration enforcement is
only lightly sketched in Campbell's article, it is clear that the
general absence of the suppression remedy in removal
proceedings after Lopez-Mendoza reduces the costs to law
enforcement of making unlawful, racially motivated stops, since
evidence acquired during such stops often may not be suppressed
in removal proceedings." But since evidence can be suppressed in
egregious cases, Campbell engages in efforts to elaborate on what
that standard requires. Campbell points to recent Third Circuit
case law which articulates a totality of the circumstances approach
to egregiousness that she believes could help litigants secure
suppression in removal proceedings arising out of discriminatory
law enforcement efforts. Courts applying this standard have an
opportunity to reinvigorate the use of suppression as a
disincentive to profiling in immigration policing.
Like McKanders, Campbell also notes that there are a
number of civil rights cases that have been litigated in tandem
with the preemption claims brought against S.B. 1070. Campbell
discusses the Friendly House/Valle del Sol litigation that is also
addressed by McKanders,88 and also discusses Ortega-Melendres v.
Arpaio, a lawsuit alleging that Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio
engaged in a pattern and practice of profiling Latinos in his
jurisdiction." The plaintiffs in the Ortega-Melendres case had
argued that Sheriff Arpaio systematically targeted Latinos on the
basis of "reasonable suspicion" that they were undocumented and
therefore present in violation of Arizona's antismuggling laws."
85. Campbell, supra note 10, at 385.
86. Chac6n, A Diversion of Attention, supra note 16, at 1611-14. Interestingly, the
Arizona court also pruned back a potentially thorny issue that emerged in Lopez-Mendoza.
In that case, the Court suggested in dicta that illegal entry was a continuing violation such
that individuals who entered without inspection were committing an ongoing crime. The
Court in Arizona rejected that notion: "The foundational premise ol Arizona is a refutation
ofLopez-Mendoza's dictum, namely that 'it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in
the United States."' Guttentag, supra note 2, at 44, quoting Arizona v. United States, 132
S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012).
87. Campbell, supra note 10, at 386-8.
88. Id. at 391-93.
89. Id. at 389-91.
90. Id. at 390.
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The early litigation triumphs of these plaintiffs suggest that there
is at least some possibility of successful equal protection litigation
in the most extreme cases of racial profiling undertaken in the
service of immigration enforcement. Campbell hopefully suggests
that, as courts reject the notion that "reasonable suspicion" of
unlawful immigration status can ever be the basis of legitimate law
enforcement stops by state and local actors, states will move away
from their efforts to control immigration policy through state and
local laws:
McKanders and Campbell both make it clear that the
concerns about the racial animus and racially discriminatory
policing helped to drive the Arizona litigation. Preemption
arguments stood in for these more immediate concerns because,
as the Arizona decision demonstrates, the preemption doctrine was
a more direct route to the injunction of many potentially
discriminatory restrictionist provisions. But Campbell and
McKanders remind the reader that, while the preemption
litigation headed off some potentially discriminatory enforcement
practices, it did not eliminate those practices. And once litigants
are faced with bringing equal protection challenges, the
jurisprudence is strewn with obstacles that might impede the
development of viable legal claims even where the discriminatory
intent and effects of these laws seem apparent.
McKanders and Campbell have done a good job of
highlighting the equal protection concerns that laws like S.B. 1070
present. It would be extremely helpful to both scholars and
litigants if McKanders and Campbell take the opportunity in
future work to provide additional analysis that helps to explain the
key to (thus far) successful litigation strategies like the one
pursued in the Ortega-Melendres case, and to identify ways that
other litigants might similarly deploy the equal protection
doctrine to fight against immigration laws that reify racial
hierarchy and sanction race-based discrimination.
91. Id. at 394.
92. See Johnson, supra note 2. For a more detailed discussion of the ways in which
preemption stands in for substantive individual rights claims in immigration cases, see
Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59
DUKE L.J. 1723, 1929-36 (2010).
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III. CONCLUSIONS
The four articles in this symposium provide useful
reflections on the state of immigration regulation and
enforcement in the post-Arizona world. The authors do important
work in tracing out the limits that the Arizona decision imposes on
state-level immigration restrictions and on certain enforcement
practices, and by highlighting the shortcomings of the litigation
and the future need for effective equal protection advocacy. As
evidenced by this collection of articles, although the Arizona
decision has sharply curtailed state and local immigration
enforcement, it has not ended the need for scholarly attention to
the topic. These articles offer important contributions to the
ongoing dialogue.
